Baron Discovery Strategy | Q3 2024
Performance
Baron Discovery Strategy (the Strategy) was up 13.53% in the quarter, outperforming the Russell 2000 Growth Index (the Benchmark) by 5.12%. For the year-to-date period, the Strategy returned 9.49%, 3.73% below the Benchmark return of 13.22%. We were pleased with the performance during the third quarter, and we feel that it is possible that the bear market in small-cap growth stocks that started way back in February 2021 is finally ending. We have been talking about the divergence between small-cap growth and large-cap valuations for several quarters now, but to give you a sense of how challenged small-cap growth has been, before this quarter, the Benchmark had only beaten the S&P 500 Index in two of the last 14 quarters. We have not seen small-cap growth quarterly underperformance of this magnitude since the late 1990s. A striking example of disparate performance within a single economy can be observed by comparing the S&P 500 Index and the Benchmark Index. Over the past three years, the S&P 500 has experienced a cumulative return of 55.81%, while the Benchmark has declined by 13.41%. Such a significant divergence is typically associated with investments in distinct economies with contrasting economic trajectories. Yet, both indices represent domestic assets.
Baron Discovery Strategy (net)2 | Baron Discovery Strategy (gross)2 | Russell 2000 Growth Index2 | Russell 3000 Index2 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Three Months3 | 13.53% | 13.81% | 8.41% | 6.23% | ||||
Nine Month3 | 9.49% | 10.29% | 13.22% | 20.63% | ||||
One Year | 23.18% | 24.39% | 27.66% | 35.19% | ||||
Three Years | (5.37)% | (4.44)% | (0.35)% | 10.29% | ||||
Five Years | 10.94% | 12.04% | 8.82% | 15.26% | ||||
Ten Years | 12.20% | 13.23% | 8.95% | 12.83% | ||||
Since Inception (October 31, 2013)4 | 12.46% | 13.42% | 8.36% | 12.94% |
Baron Discovery Strategy (net)2 | Baron Discovery Strategy (gross)2 | Russell 2000 Growth Index2 | Russel 3000 Index2 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2019 | 26.97% | 28.24% | 28.48% | 31.02% | ||||
2020 | 66.25% | 67.93% | 34.63% | 20.89% | ||||
2021 | 4.92% | 5.97% | 2.83% | 25.66% | ||||
2022 | (34.96)% | (34.32)% | (26.36)% | (19.21)% | ||||
2023 | 22.80% | 24.00% | 18.66% | 25.96% |
For strategy reporting purposes, the Firm is defined as all accounts managed by Baron Capital Management, Inc. (“BCM”) and BAMCO, Inc. (“BAMCO”), registered investment advisers wholly owned by Baron Capital Group, Inc. As of 9/30/2024, total Firm assets under management were approximately $43.4 billion. The Strategy is a time-weighted, total return composite of all small-cap accounts managed on a fully discretionary basis using our standard investment process. Accounts in the Strategy are market-value weighted and are included on the first day of the month following one full month under management. Gross performance figures do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees and any other expenses incurred in the management of the investment advisory account. Actual client returns will be reduced by the advisory fees and any other expenses incurred in the management of the investment advisory account. A full description of investment advisory fees is supplied in the Firm’s Form ADV Part 2A. Valuations and returns are computed and stated in U.S. dollars. Performance figures reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Baron Discovery Strategy is currently composed of one mutual fund managed by BAMCO and a separately managed account managed by BCM. The Strategy invests mainly in small cap growth companies. BAMCO and BCM claim compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). To receive a complete list and description of the Firm’s strategies or a GIPS Report please contact us at 1-800 99BARON. GIPS® is a registered trademark owned by CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse, promote or warrant the accuracy or quality of the report.
Performance data quoted represents past performance. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
† The Strategy’s historical performance was impacted by gains from IPOs and there is no guarantee that these results can be repeated or that the Strategy’s level of participation in IPOs will be the same in the future.
(1)With the exception of performance data, most of the data is based on a representative account. Such data may vary for each client in the Strategy due to asset size, market conditions, client guidelines, and diversity of portfolio holdings. The representative account is the account in the Strategy that we believe most closely reflects the current portfolio management style for the Strategy. Representative account data is supplemental information.
(2)The Russell 2000® Growth Index measures the performance of small-sized U.S. companies that are classified as growth. The Russell 3000® Index measures the performance of the largest 3,000 US companies representing approximately 98% of the investable US equity market, as of the most recent reconstitution. All rights in the FTSE Russell Index (the “Index”) vest in the relevant LSE Group company which owns the Index. Russell® is a trademark of the relevant LSE Group company and is used by any other LSE Group company under license. Neither LSE Group nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the indexes or data and no party may rely on any indexes or data contained in this communication. The Strategy includes reinvestment of dividends, net of withholding taxes, while the Russell 2000® Growth and Russell 3000® Indexes include reinvestment of dividends before taxes. Reinvestment of dividends positively impacts the performance results. The indexes are unmanaged. Index performance is not Strategy performance. Investors cannot invest directly in an index.
(3)Not annualized
(4)The Strategy has a different inception date than its representative account, which is 9/30/2013.
Over the past several quarters, our quarterly letters have highlighted the unsustainable divergence between small-cap growth and large-cap stocks. We predicted that a decline in inflation and subsequent rate cuts by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) would catalyze a rotation into small-cap growth stocks. Inflation has been trending lower for multiple quarters, prompting the Fed to reduce rates by 0.50% in September. Small-cap stocks responded positively to this news, and the higher-quality growth companies within the Strategy outperformed the Benchmark during this period.
While some might dismiss this performance as an anomaly, similar to the short-lived small-cap rally in early 2023, we believe this quarter’s scenario is distinct. Several factors support our conviction in the small-cap growth versus large-cap “reversion to the mean” trade:
First, the Fed’s stance has shifted from neutral to dovish. As we’ve discussed previously, our portfolio companies reported that inflation and supply chain issues, prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic, had largely dissipated by the end of 2022. Government inflation data has consistently declined over several quarters, enabling the Fed to initiate interest rate normalization. Lower rates benefit our smaller growth companies in two primary ways:
- Increased Present Value of Future Cash Flows: Lower interest rates enhance the present value of future cash flows, particularly for small-cap growth stocks with higher growth rates. This leads to expanded valuation multiples and upward pressure on stock prices.
- Economic Growth Tailwind: Lower interest rates stimulate economic growth, creating a favorable environment for our portfolio companies to accelerate revenue growth.
Second, small-cap growth stocks remain attractively valued compared to their large-cap counterparts. In fact, small-cap growth is currently trading at its largest discount to large-cap in the past 25 years.
Third, negative earnings revisions have been prevalent in recent years. We anticipate a reversal of this trend as year-over-year earnings comparisons become more favorable. Periods of positive earnings revisions are bullish for both valuation multiples and stock prices.
Fourth, Chinese economic growth has been a drag on global economic growth. However, the stimulus measures announced by the Chinese government in late September, potentially reaching $1.4 trillion, could revitalize the Chinese economy and positively impact global economic activity.
In conclusion, numerous factors support a rotation into small-cap growth stocks, especially our secular growers. The combination of lower interest rates, stronger economic growth, attractive valuations, and easier earnings comparisons creates a promising environment for stronger small company fundamentals and valuation multiples.
Top Contributors to Performance
Contribution to Return (%) | ||
---|---|---|
CareDx, Inc. | 1.72 | |
Axon Enterprise, Inc. | 1.23 | |
Tempus AI, Inc. | 1.12 | |
Exact Sciences Corporation | 0.94 | |
Veracyte, Inc. | 0.87 |
CareDx, Inc. is a diagnostic company that facilitates donor matches pre-transplant and rejection monitoring post-transplant. In August 2024, CMS “retired” a draft local coverage determination that had previously caused a major reimbursement overhang, massively impacting CareDx’s revenues and share price. Shares outperformed for the quarter as testing volumes accelerated, leading the company to beat second quarter consensus estimates as well as its full-year guidance. The silver lining from the difficult period CareDx experienced is that it has optimized its operating expense structure and should see meaningfully increased profitability as it gets back to prior testing volumes and beyond. Even after a big rebound in the shares this year, we still believe CareDx’s valuation remains inexpensive.
Axon Enterprise, Inc. is the leading provider of tasers, body cameras, software, and other solutions for law enforcement. Shares rose following an exceptionally strong second quarter earnings report, highlighted by revenue growth of over 25% for the 10th straight quarter. This was led by nearly 50% growth in Axon’s software business. Axon introduced Draft One software for law enforcement officers, which leverages generative AI and body-worn camera audio to produce high-quality draft report narratives in seconds, freeing up 20% to 25% of an officer’s day. This product showcases the many potential generative AI use cases in Axon’s business. International bookings were up 100%, driven in part by growing interest in Draft One and the Taser 10 product. Run by a visionary founder with a best-in-class team, the company is continually pushing new and innovative products in the pursuit of becoming the de-facto public safety ecosystem. We believe Axon will become a much larger company over time.
Shares of Tempus AI, Inc. contributed to performance. Tempus is a cancer diagnostics company that provides genomic testing results. Tempus has also amassed an over 200 petabyte proprietary multimodal dataset that combines clinical patient data with genomic testing data. In addition to using this data to empower more intelligent diagnostics for its own tests, Tempus also licenses this data to biopharmaceutical companies which use it to design smarter clinical trials and identify potential new drug targets. We think this proprietary dataset is unique with meaningful barriers to entry, and brings meaningful value to biopharmaceutical R&D. We took advantage of this volatility to buy a meaningful position when shares sold off into the low $20s per share from an IPO price of $37. When shares spiked into the mid-$70s, likely due to short sellers covering losses as shares rose, we took profits on a meaningful portion of the investment. We believed the valuation had become stretched, as shares now trade in the high $40s to low $50s level. We like our position sizing now, and would add to the position at lower valuations. We believe that Tempus has significant growth ahead of it and we are excited about its unique business model.
Top Detractors from Performance
Contribution to Return (%) | ||
---|---|---|
Montrose Environmental Group, Inc. | –1.21 | |
indie Semiconductor, Inc. | –0.69 | |
Chart Industries, Inc. | –0.44 | |
Couchbase, Inc. | –0.32 | |
Inari Medical, Inc. | –0.31 |
Montrose Environmental Group, Inc., a leading environmental services company, underperformed in the quarter. The stock pulled back sharply after the Supreme Court decided the Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo case in June 2024, which overturned the so-called “Chevron Deference Doctrine” named from the 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. case. Chevron held that federal courts should defer to the decisions of administrative agencies when they are interpreting a law or statute. Now future agency decision-making will come under more scrutiny and court challenge. Because Montrose derives most of its business from EPA related work, investors grew concerned that its growth could slow. We think this concern is overblown. Loper did not require a reassessment of regulations that are already in place (which is basically all of Montrose’s current business). In addition, Montrose’s business drivers are diverse and its testing and advisory business benefits from complexity. We added to our position on weakness. While the Loper case might affect the timing and magnitude of Montrose’s opportunity to clean up PFAS (so-called “forever plastics”) sites (since EPA regulations are currently being decided), we still believe this is a huge potential line of business for the company. We continue to believe that Montrose, as a vertically integrated environmental services company, has a unique value proposition to customers and we believe that the company will be successful in the execution of its strategy to grow organically and through acquisition. And valuation is compelling at a mid-single-digit multiple of cash flow for an industrial company with Montrose’s growth characteristics.
Indie Semiconductor, Inc. is a fabless designer, developer, and marketer of automotive semiconductors for advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) and connected car, user experience, and electrification applications. Indie’s stock fell during the quarter as it guided full-year 2024 revenue growth below expectations for the third quarter in a row. This is due to macro factors as opposed to problems specific to indie itself. Overall auto industry production is expected to be incrementally worse and excess inventory at indie’s customers has been a headwind to volume growth. Despite the near-term macro softening, indie continues to win new sockets in future platforms and remains very well positioned for growth over the medium and long term supported by its $6.3 billion design win backlog, of which $4.6 billion is in ADAS applications. It also is expecting some very large program ramps in 2025, including a marquee radar-related rollout, the biggest program in the company’s history. We believe indie can continue to significantly outpace the broader industry and approach $1 billion in revenue by the end of this decade with premium margins. We believe its share price will recover as rapid growth resumes in 2025.
Chart Industries, Inc. is a global leader in the design, engineering, and manufacturing of process and storage technologies and equipment for gas and liquid handling. Shares of Chart fell during the quarter as the company missed earnings expectations on revenue recognition timing and lowered full-year guidance. Despite this, fundamentals for the business continue to be very strong, with record revenue, backlog, and margins in the quarter and strong orders, with a book-to-bill greater than one. The issues for the stock continue to be self-inflicted, with management setting too-high expectations and continuing to need to cut them back. After several conversations with management, we believe that they will better set expectations moving forward. Chart is unique in its breadth of technology and solutions capabilities with EBITDA margins growing double digits in long-duration secular growth markets (LNG, hydrogen, carbon capture, water treatment, etc.), and we believe as the near-term expectations-related issues subside, the company will earn the valuation we believe it deserves, driving significant near- and long-term upside in the stock.
Portfolio Structure
Our top 10 holdings represented 29.4% of the portfolio, roughly in line with historical levels.
Year Acquired | Quarter End Investment Value ($ millions) | Percent of Net Assets (%) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Axon Enterprise, Inc. | 2022 | 57.6 | 3.8 | ||
DraftKings Inc. | 2023 | 48.4 | 3.2 | ||
CyberArk Software Ltd. | 2022 | 46.7 | 3.1 | ||
Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. | 2020 | 45.3 | 3.0 | ||
CareDx, Inc. | 2024 | 44.8 | 3.0 | ||
Guidewire Software, Inc. | 2022 | 43.1 | 2.9 | ||
Advanced Energy Industries, Inc. | 2019 | 41.6 | 2.8 | ||
PAR Technology Corporation | 2018 | 39.1 | 2.6 | ||
Clearwater Analytics Holdings, Inc. | 2021 | 37.9 | 2.5 | ||
SiteOne Landscape Supply, Inc. | 2016 | 37.7 | 2.5 |
Recent Activity
Year Acquired | Quarter End Market Cap ($ billions) | Net Amoun Purchased ($ millions) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
TWFG, Inc. | 2024 | 1.5 | 12.6 | ||
Inari Medical, Inc. | 2020 | 2.4 | 8.1 | ||
Liberty Media Corporation - Liberty Live | 2023 | 4.7 | 5.9 | ||
SiteOne Landscape Supply, Inc. | 2016 | 6.8 | 2.9 | ||
Montrose Environmental Group, Inc. | 2020 | 0.9 | 1.9 |
Our largest purchase during the quarter was TWFG, Inc., a Texas-based insurance broker that supports independent insurance agents in the property and casualty (P&C) space. TWFG primarily helps captive agents make the transition over to independence by offering a turnkey independent agent solution called “Agency-in-a-Box.” TWFG provides agents with the carrier relationships needed to sell insurance as an independent agent (these are often hard to obtain as a sole operator), as well as the technology, training, back office, and brand needed to run a successful independent agency. TWFG has a capital-efficient business model where the independent agent is responsible for the ongoing expenses of his or her business, while TWFG keeps 20% of the commissions generated.
The U.S. P&C market has over $850 billion in annual premiums, of which over $400 billion is spent on Personal Lines. Over time, captive agents – who only represent one insurer – have been losing their share in distribution to independent agents. Independent agents are not exclusive to any one insurer, so they can offer customers a much broader range of insurance options and thus can write more premiums and earn more commissions, as compared to captive agents. In homeowners’ insurance, the share of premiums written by independent agents increased from 41% to 49% from 2011 to 2021 as more agents left captive models and became independents. TWFG is squarely focused on serving this growing pool of independents.
TWFG was founded in 2001 by former insurance agent Gordy Bunch. Bunch has successfully scaled the business to over $1 billion in written premiums, with minimal outside capital. TWFG now operates in over 40 states and serves over 400 TWFG-branded independent agencies. We believe TWFG can continue its growth by acquiring additional agencies as the industry shifts towards independent agency models. The 80/20 commission split offers agents a compelling value proposition, allowing them to retain a significant portion of the economic benefits. With over 40,000 agents in a highly fragmented industry, TWFG has a substantial growth runway. Furthermore, management has initiated a strategy of acquiring smaller agencies on favorable terms, which boosts both revenue and profit margins. We anticipate that the IPO proceeds will be utilized to expedite these accretive acquisitions. TWFG’s strong track record of growth, capital-efficient business model, opportunities for accretive M&A, large addressable market, and founder-CEO with substantial ownership make it a compelling investment opportunity.
We added to our position in Inari Medical, Inc. in the quarter at what we believe are attractive valuations for a market leading medical device company. Inari offers catheter-based devices to remove clots caused by venous thromboembolism (VTE). VTE is a disease state that manifests as deep vein thrombosis (DVT), in which a clot cuts off blood flow in a deep vein (usually in the leg), and as pulmonary embolism (PE), when the clot in the leg breaks off and circulates to lodge in the blood vessels that supply the lungs. Despite beating its second quarter earnings and raising full-year guidance, Inari shares have been pressured after the release of competitor Penumbra, Inc.’s new product for DVT treatment. Both companies have very good products for DVT. We believe that there are huge opportunities for both companies to grow in DVT (by displacing other treatments), and Inari, in particular, has even bigger opportunities in PE (which it dominates) also by displacing other treatments.
PE and DVT are each markets worth about $3 billion per year (a total market opportunity of $6 billion). Right now, about 80% of patients receive only blood thinners, which do nothing for existing clots. Only 20% receive any sort of more in-depth intervention. Of this 20%, a third are on thrombolytics, which have a high risk of bleeding and require an ICU stay for monitoring. Inari is working on studies that it believes will show the superiority of its devices to lytics or blood thinners. Its first PE study (superiority of an Inari device to lytics) is due to read out in the fourth quarter of 2024. It has another PE study that should read out over the next couple of years and could help open up the remaining 80% of the PE market (superiority of an Inari device versus blood thinners). Additionally, Inari is at various stages of launching multiple new products (for other venous and arterial blockage conditions) which could unlock nearly $4 billion in additional addressable market opportunities. And it is launching its products in foreign markets as well. In other words, although a portion of its markets are facing increased competition, we believe there is a huge amount of overall growth opportunity that is wide open for Inari, and the stock is trading at a valuation that currently does not reflect these opportunities.
We added to our position in Liberty Media Corporation – Liberty Live, a tracking stock whose primary asset is its holdings in Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (LYV). Live Nation, which produces live concerts and owns Ticketmaster, traded down when the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued the company for anticompetitive behavior. We added to our position in Liberty Live as we do not believe the DOJ suit will lead to the breakup of Live Nation and we believe that Live Nation trades at a valuation well below its intrinsic value. Shares of both Live Nation and Liberty Live recovered during the quarter, ending the period near their 52-week highs.
Year Acquired | Market Cap When Acquired ($ billions) | Quarter End Market Cap or Market Cap When Sold ($ billions) | Net Amount Sold ($ millions) | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Silk Road Medical, Inc. | 2019 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 26.3 | |||
Tempus AI, Inc. | 2024 | 6.6 | 8.7 | 23.2 | |||
Definitive Healthcare Corp. | 2021 | 4.0 | 0.4 | 12.7 | |||
Nova Ltd. | 2018 | 0.7 | 6.1 | 7.0 | |||
ASGN Incorporated | 2022 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 5.6 |
We sold Silk Road Medical, Inc. when it announced it was going to be purchased by Boston Scientific Corporation. We had always been believers in the company’s products which address carotid artery blockages through a proprietary, minimal invasive stenting procedure. We addressed why we trimmed Tempus AI, Inc. in the contributors section. We sold Definitive Healthcare Corp. after owning the company for nearly three years, and it was a very unsuccessful investment despite having fantastic margins, solid free cash flow, and what we viewed as a high-quality health care database. Ultimately, the company will need to find a way to stop the slide in organic growth that has hurt equity value for shareholders.
Outlook
The last three and a half years have been a challenging period for small company stocks. We believe the divergent performance of small-cap growth versus large-cap stocks cannot continue forever and thus, there will be a “reversion to the mean” where small-cap growth stocks can outperform large-cap stocks. The current economic backdrop of lower interest rates and some early signs of better economic growth ahead is more conducive for small-cap company fundamentals and valuations. As we look out over the medium to long term, we believe that investing in small-cap growth stocks over the next three and a half years will be significantly more profitable than it was over the last three and a half years.
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